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Abstract: The general purpose of this paper is to analyze how global 
governance works, who are its actors and how the Security Council fits in this 
description. The methodology consisted of a non-extensive bibliographical 
review of the understanding of global governance, how it works and who does 
it; followed by the normative roles of the Security Council and of the United 
Nations found in the own UN Charter, and a brief analysis of the Council’s 
and Russia’s actions in two cases studies: The Libyan intervention and the 
subsequent war on Syria. A change in the dynamics and operation of the 
Security Council could be seen as a result. 
Key-words: Global Governance; Security Council; Russia’s Vetoes; Libya; 
Syria. 
 
Resumo: O objetivo geral deste artigo é analisar como funciona a governança 
global, quem são seus atores e como o Conselho de Segurança se encaixa 
nessa descrição. A metodologia consistiu em uma revisão bibliográfica não 
extensa sobre a compreensão da governança global, como funciona e quem a 
faz; seguido pelos papéis normativos do Conselho de Segurança e das Nações 
Unidas encontrados na própria Carta das Nações Unidas, e uma breve análise 
das ações do Conselho e da Rússia em dois estudos de caso: A intervenção da 
Líbia e a guerra subsequente na Síria. Uma mudança na dinâmica e operação 
do Conselho de Segurança pode ser vista como resultado. 
Palavras-chaves: Governança Global; Conselho de Segurança; Vetos russos; 






We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save 
succeeding generations from the scourge of war, (…) 
[and] to unite our strength to maintain international peace 
and security (…) Have resolved to combine our efforts to 
accomplish these aims. (United Nations; Charter; 2019; 
Preamble) 
 
 Since the creation of the nation-state the strive for implement and coordinate the 
minimum amount of governance between them has always been present. The recognizable need 
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to deal with international problems, in a world of sovereign states whom doesn’t respond to any 
authority above them, is a classic issue that all theories of International Relations try to respond, 
each one in its own manner. Realists, for example, tend to see cooperation between sovereign 
entities through a calculus of costs and benefits and by the balance of power and capabilities of 
such entities. Institutionalists, on the other hand, advocate for the importance of institutions in 
the regulation of states actions in attempt to reach consensus about common issues and to avoid 
an endless escalation of hostilities. In other words, the academic and empirical field of 
International Relations faces, among several others, this kind of issues. 
The United Nations fits in the latter description: created by the allied great powers in 
the post-World War II to “maintain international peace and security” and “to take effective 
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace” (UNITED 
NATIONS; Charter; 2019; Chapter I, Article 1), the United Nations (UN) works as the top 
institution (or system of several organizations) that regulates all international issues between 
states with emphasis on the need to prevent breaches or threats to peace and security. In this 
sense, the Security Council of the UN shows itself as the highest authority to address and take 
decisions upon peace and security issues and to make binding decisions upon states related to 
them: being a victim of certain context of war or human rights disrespect or being the own 
perpetrators of such actions. 
In other words, the Security Council is the main responsible organ that leads the 
“collective measures” upon peace and security issues and, through its members, permanent and 
non-permanent, votes and reach consensus upon such matters. However, the permanent 
members have the power to veto any resolution that they don’t agree upon, blocking the entire 
resolution of the Council and preventing any action by other states relating to the voted issue.  
In the post-Libyan intervention, resolutions of the Security Council were vetoed and 
blocked several times because no consensus took place about the operationalization of measures 
to be taken in the events faced by the world after 2011, especially the war on Syria. That being 
said, the question that this paper aims to clarify is: how the global governance practiced by the 
Security Council is being blocked by Russia in the post-Lybian intervention? 
In the post-World War II, Russia, still under the auspices of USSR, hardly vetoed many 
of the Security Council Resolutions concerning interventions or peace operations. (NIKITIN, 
2012). However, after the dissolution of the USSR, in the early 1990’s, Russia started vetoing 
several SCR (Security Council Resolutions) concerning UN Operations in other countries, 
especially between the years of 2004 and 2014. (SOUZA & MACHADO, 2015; NIKITIN, 
2012). Several explanations could be listed from this kind of behavior. 
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The hypothesis of the present paper is that Russia’s actions, with focus on the post-
Libya intervention in 2011, emphasizing the war on Syria, could be understood as a 
consequence of other UN interventions, led by the western powers, that did not please Russia’s 
and China’s, political view about international intervention, causing a rupture on the 
multilateral cooperation, hence, freezing the global governance.  
The first session of the paper addresses the problématique of what can be understood by 
global governance, bringing its nuances and the sources of authority of the so called “global 
governors”. The second session brings the normative parameters found in the Charter of the 
United Nations that authorizes the Security Council to act on behalf of states as a global 
governor and elucidate the origins of the veto power of its permanent members. The third 
session brings a general view of under what aegis the Libyan intervention took place and how 
the members of the Council acted in it. In sequence, the fourth session brings a general view of 
the role of Russia as member of the Council and its vetoes, abstentions and support in the past 
decades. Finally, the last session brings some possible explanations to the increased amount of 
vetoes of Russia in the Council analyzing the post-Libyan intervention and the war on Syria. 
 
II. GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND ITS NUANCES 
 
To start the discussions around the role of the United Nations and the Security Council 
in maintaining the so called “global governance”, it is necessary to understand first, what the 
concept means. According to Avant, Finnemore and Sell (2010), “global governance” can be 
understood as “‘the sum of organizations, policy instruments, financing mechanisms, rules, 
procedures, and norms’ or, also, ‘the collective effort to identify, understand, and address 
worldwide problems that are beyond the capacity of individual States’” (NAJAM et al. 2006; 
CLUB OF ROME apud AVANT, FINNEMORE & SELL 2010, p. 1). Another complementary 
and useful conceptualization about global governance is that it “refers to existing collective 
arrangements to solve problems” and is, additionally, “the sum of laws, norms, policies, and 
institutions that define, constitute, and mediate relations among citizens, society, markets, and 
the state in the international arena. (WEISS, THAKUR, 2010, p. 6). 
It is worth noting that global governance doesn’t require the presence of, and indeed is 
not lead by, a “central authority” (WEISS, THAKUR, 2010) (like a single State, for example) 
to operate. As Avant, Finnemore and Sell (2010) notes, “global governance is something that 
happens, no one apparently, actually does it”. In other words, global governance can be 
understood as a “collective arrangement” of actors, and these arrangements can “bring more 
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predictability, stability, and order to transboundary problems than we might expect”. (WEISS, 
THAKUR, 2010: 6; AVANT, FINNEMORE, SELL, 2010, p. 1).  
In this sense, who, or what, is responsible for making this collective arrangement 
happen? According to Karns, Mingst, Stiles (2010) the United Nations (UN) has taken, since 
the World War II, the position of the “centerpiece of global governance”, because “it is the only 
IGO [Intergovernmental Organization] with global scope and nearly universal membership, and 
its agenda encompasses the broadest range of governance issues”. The UN system serves, then, 
“as a catalyst for global policy networks and partnerships with other actors”. In sum, the UN 
“is the central site for multilateral diplomacy” and therefore, for global governance. (KARNS, 
MINGST, STILES, 2010, p. 109). 
Nevertheless, even considering the UN as the centerpiece of global governance, Avant, 
Finnemore and Sell (2010) work on the definition of the “agents of global governance” that 
they call “global governors”. Global governors are “authorities who exercise power across 
borders for purposes of affecting policy”. In this sense, global governors “create issues, set 
agendas, establish and implement rules or programs, and evaluate and/or adjudicate outcomes”. 
(AVANT, FINNEMORE, SELL, 2010, p. 2).  
This definition seems to have a straight forward connection with the broad concept of 
global governance as a collective arrangement because “governance is not a solo act, and 
governors can rarely accomplish ends alone. They divide labor, delegate, compete, and 
cooperate with one another in many ways to produce the outcomes we observe”. (AVANT, 
FINNEMORE, SELL, 2010, p. 2-3). Returning to the notion that the UN is the centerpiece of 
global governance, it seems plausible to say that the UN encompasses and incorporates a vast 
range of global governors within its system.  
Following this rationale, if global governors are “authorities” who exercise power across 
borders for a variety of reasons, it can be said, then, that they possess some kind of “authority”, 
understood as an “instrument” for doing things and reaching outcomes. But what is this 
authority and where does it come from? Avant, Finnemore and Sell (2010), define authority “as 
the ability to induce deference in others” and it comes from a “social relationship (…) that not 
exist in a vacuum”. Thus “authority is created”, and in a certain way sustained, “by the 
recognition, even if only tacit or informal, of others”. However, it does not always mean that 
whoever got to recognize, or respond, an authority will always agree with or like it. It means 
“that one defers to the authority”. In sum, it is somewhat important having a “set of 
constituents” that express an acceptance of an authority by others that allows this same authority 
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to “exert greater influence than would be the case if she did not have their deference”. (AVANT, 
FINNEMORE, SELL, 2010, p. 9-10). 
 Therefore, and still according to Avant, Finnemore and Sell (2010), the deference to an 
authority seems to occur for a multiplicity of reasons. In their words: 
Some actors are authoritative because of the office they hold. The President of the 
United States is authoritative because he or she holds that office; when that person 
leaves office, deference will be accorded to the next individual who holds it. Some 
actors may be authoritative because of inherent qualities others see in that person. 
Nelson Mandela, for example, has a certain amount of authority on the international 
stage because of his moral character and reputation. Those did not disappear when he 
left the presidency of his country. Actors may also be authoritative because of what 
or whom they represent. They may represent a respected institution, an 
underrepresented other, or a lofty ideal. Many nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs), for example, induce deference (or try to) by claiming to represent noble ideas 
or deserving others. (AVANT, FINNEMORE, SELL, 2010, p. 10). 
 
 It is necessary, however, to consider the other side of this relation: whoever exerts 
deference and authority (governor) upon the others (governed), can’t actually do whatever they 
want because “their actions must be seen by the governed (and others) to accord with whatever 
authorizes them to net”. In order to exemplify this assertion: “An NGO that gains authority by 
claiming to represent noble ideas can only continue to use that authority as long as others see it 
as following through on this commitment”. Or, yet, an office holder, like the Secretary General, 
for example, “may command deference when fulfilling the duties of that office but nor in a 
private or nonofficial capacity”. (AVANT, FINNEMORE, SELL, 2010, p. 10-11). 
 In this sense, it is plausible to say that global governors would possess some kind of 
“authority base” that allows them to govern and to exert the deference they need to accomplish 
outcomes. These bases of authority can come, broadly speaking, in five varieties: the 
“institutional, delegated, expert, principled, and capacity-based authority”. (AVANT, 
FINNEMORE, SELL, 2010, p. 11). Each one is defined as follows: (1) “Institutional (or 
institution-based) authority derives from holding office in some established organizational 
structure. Their authority is defined and limited, however, by the rules and purposes of the 
institution that authorizes them”. An example would be the authority received by the positions 
of heads of multinational and multilateral corporations like the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) or the World Health Organization (WHO). Expanding the example:  If the head of the 
IMF suddenly started pronouncing policy on nuclear proliferation, for example, he (or 
theoretically she) would not generate deference. Indeed, such action would probably be viewed 
as illegitimate (…)” (AVANT, FINNEMORE, SELL, 2010, p. 11). 
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 The second variety is the (2) “delegated (or delegation-based)”. This authority “is 
authority on loan from some other set of authoritative actors”. The delegate authority comes 
directly from states, or sub-state agencies, whom delegates this authority to “international 
organizations (IO’s), firms and non-governmental organizations (NGO’s)” to decide and reach 
outcomes in some specific issue, or sets of issues, that these states, alone, wouldn’t reach. 
(AVANT, FINNEMORE, SELL, 2010). The third variety is the (3) “expert (or expertise-based) 
authority”. This one is an “authority based on specialized knowledge. Unlike delegated or 
institutional authority, it inheres in the actor”. Organizations and institutions generally possess 
“experts on staff or delegate complex technical tasks to experts”, but it’s important keep in mind 
however, that “expert authority is limited in its use by the content of its expertise”. By 
exemplification: “Education professionals are unlikely to induce much deference if they start 
making rules or expressing opinions about technical requirements for the electronics industry 
and vice versa”. (MUNDY AND BUTHE apud AVANT, FINNEMORE, SELL, 2010, p. 12). 
 Concerning the fourth variety, the (4) principled (or principle-based) authority is the 
one “legitimated by service to some widely accepted set of principles, morals, or values. It can 
inhere in both actors and offices”. Prerogatives of “moral values” like freedom, peace, 
prosperity, security etc. functions as examples of “authorizing tools for a wide variety of actors 
seeking to govern globally” in the principled-based authority. In this sense, NGO’s generally 
benefit from the understandings of moral authority in reason of this “perceived altruism, even 
if they happen to be incompetent and do little to further the causes they profess”. And, Desmond 
Tutu, as Avant, Finnemore and Sell (2010) shows, would probably be an example of both kinds 
(actors and offices) of principled authority, because “he has moral authority as bishop in the 
Anglican Church, but also because of his principled beliefs, personal history, and character”. 
(AVANT, FINNEMORE, SELL, 2010, p. 13). 
 And last, but not least, the (5) “capacity-based authority involves deference based on 
perceived competence. This has close kinship with institutional, delegated, and, potentially, 
expert authority, but is its own distinct form”. In this variety, the authority is expected to 
accomplish some set of results not by “holding a particular office in an institution or possession 
of any rarified knowledge”, but by his or her “capacity for effective action” that creates the 
necessary legitimacy for his/her authority. However, it would be hard to think of a “pure” 
capacity-based authority, because: 
Most global governors who are effective at solving problems get their opportunities 
to do so from some other source of authority. For example, the perceived capability 
of corporations working in conflict zones to monitor funds and implement policies 
was central to efforts to assign authority to them for reducing conflict. Note too that, 
conversely, lack of efficacy or competence can undermine authority drawn from other 
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sources. The IMF and World Bank have had their authority questioned based on 
accusations of poor performance. Perceived failures in peacekeeping have strained the 
UN's authority to undertake such missions. (AVANT, FINNEMORE, SELL, 2010, p. 
14). 
 
 In sum, the capacity-based authority shows itself as a “mix” of others kinds of authority 
that has, in some sense, a “sensible” form of keep in use because of perception of low, or high, 
efficacy of those who defers to the “capacity” of that authority in reaching outcomes. 
In this sense, one possible question arises after all the discussions made until here: If, 
then, global governance is the “collective effort to identify, understand, and address worldwide 
problems that are beyond the capacity of individual States” and global governors are 
“authorities who exercise power across borders for purposes of affecting policy” (AVANT, 
FINNEMORE AND SELL 2010, p. 1-2) who, or what, is responsible for dealing and creating 
outcomes in order to affect policy for questions that threaten the international peace and security 
and that is beyond the capacity of individual States? To answer this question, the next session 
will concentrate in the attributions and responsibilities of the UN’s Security Council in dealing 
with questions of peace and security around the globe. 
 
III. SECURITY COUNCIL FUNCTIONS AND ITS ROLE AS GLOBAL GOVERNOR 
 
Returning to the notion mentioned in the previous session, the United Nations takes the 
position as the centerpiece of global governance and has a core responsibility, among others 
and as stated by its Charter, of maintaining the international peace and security. Its Article 1, 
paragraph §1, states: 
The Purposes of the United Nations are: 1. To maintain international peace and 
security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and 
removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other 
breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with 
the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of 
international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace. 
(UNITED NATIONS; 2019 Charter; Chapter 1; Article 1; §1). 
 
 In this sense, Karns, Mingst, and Stiles (2010), understand that “the UN Security 
Council is the core of the global security system and is the primary legitimizer of actions dealing 
with threats to peace and security”. (KARNS, MINGST, STILES, p. 109). Chapter V, Article 
24, and Chapter VII, Article 39 are complementary in stating that: 
Article 24, §1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, 
its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its 
duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf. Article 39, 
§1.  The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide 
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what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or 
restore international peace and security. (UNITED NATIONS; 2019 Charter; Chapter 
V, Article 24; §1; Chapter VII, Article 39, §1). 
 
Articles 41 e 42 mentioned above dictates that, in case of an existing threat or “breach” 
in international security, the Council has the authority to decide what measures not involving 
the use of force like, for example, the “complete or partial interruption of economic relations 
and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the 
severance of diplomatic relations” (Article 41), should be taken in order to “give effect to its 
decisions; and, in case of the measures mentioned above prove themselves as “inadequate” in 
solving the issues of peace and security, the Council has the authority to “take such action by 
air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and 
security” (Article 42), and, additionally, these actions may take the form of blockades “and 
others operations by air, sea, and land forces”. (UNITED NATIONS, 2019; Charter; Chapter 
VII, Articles 41-42). 
Concerning the composition of the Council, Article 23 identifies, first, the membership 
of states that are part of the permanent members (P5), being: The Republic of China, the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. And about the membership non-permanent 
states, the same Article expresses that they “shall be elected for a term of two years”. (UNITED 
NATIONS; Charter; 2019; Chapter V, Article 23). It’s worth noting too that the same States 
holding the position of permanent members were the former great powers of Allied countries 
that fought against the Axis in the Second World War. One might say that the criteria of this 
membership was, in some sense, arbitrary, but, in the words of Luck (2010), the very reason, 
and the priorities at the time, of this membership, “were performance, unity, and control, not 
equity” (LUCK, 2010, p. 63), what gives an overview of the purposes and distribution of power 
between the great powers in that context.  
Broadly speaking, these are the purposes and functions of the Security Council given by 
the Charter of the UN its member states. However, in what sense could the Security Council be 
described as an agent of global governance, (i.e. a global governor), in the terms expressed by 
Avant, Finnemore and Sell (2010)? First, if global governance can be defined, as seen before, 
as “the collective effort to identify, understand, and address worldwide problems that are 
beyond the capacity of individual States” (AVANT, FINNEMORE AND SELL 2010, p. 1). 
The Security Council play this role when considering its very Article 1 where it says that, to 
maintain the problem of peace and security, the Council shall take “effective collective 
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measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts 
of aggression or other breaches of the peace” (UNITED NATIONS, Charter, Article 1, 2019). 
And second, if global governors are “authorities who exercise power across borders for 
purposes of affecting policy” and “create issues, set agendas, establish and implement rules or 
programs, and evaluate and/or adjudicate outcomes” (AVANT, FINNEMORE, SELL, 2010, p. 
2), the Council acts as a global governor as described in its Articles 24 (see in the next 
paragraphs) and 39 and by Article 26 where it states that “the Security Council shall be 
responsible for formulating (...) plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for 
the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments”, which implies the responsibility 
of setting agendas and the implementation of programs to deal with specific issues. (UNITED 
NATIONS, Charter, Article 24-26-39; 2019). 
But in which of the five kinds of authority can the Security Council be classified? First, 
would be plausible to say that the Council has an Institutional authority given that it holds office 
in the organizational structure of the United Nations. And second, their authority is constrained 
and defined by the rules of the institution, because, similarly to the example of Avant, 
Finnemore and Sell (2010) in the later session about the heads of IMF, if the members of 
Security Council started pronouncing policy about non security or peace issues, like everyday 
commerce and trade, for example, this action wouldn’t be viewed as legitimate, and therefore, 
wouldn’t generate deference. 
 It seems plausible to consider, as well, the Security Council also having the delegated 
authority kind because this authority comes from its own Charter, where Article 24 stipulates 
that “its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this 
responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf”; and Article 25 asserts that the “the 
Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security 
Council in accordance with the present Charter”. (UNITED NATIONS, Charter, Article 24-25; 
2019). It is possible to say, then, that the Council is recognized, or at least is normatively 
expected to be recognized, and delegated by the other states of UN to take care of issues 
concerning peace and security, and therefore, has the necessary legitimacy to defer this same 
authority upon them. 
 However, it would be hard to assign to the Security Council having the third kind of 
authority, the expertise-based, because, as seen, this kind of authority suppose a “specialized 
knowledge” that inheres the actor. It seems odd to say that the Council has an expert or technical 
knowledge about how to deal with peace and security issues when it’s very composition and 
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purposes found in the Charter, stipulates its capacity mostly by the political and material 
capability of the great powers, in the permanent seats, plus the rotary countries in the non-
permanent seats. And not by technical or expert knowledge like economists, at the IMF, or 
nuclear engineers, at the International Atomic Energy Agency, for example.   
 Concerning the principled-based authority, it is only plausible to assign this kind of 
authority to the Security Council as long as people and States consider its actions by having a 
wide set of principles, values or morals in it. As seen before, this is possible to occur given that 
peace, prosperity, security and freedom can be seen as “moral values” that acts as “authorizing 
tools” to global governors “seeking to govern globally”. (AVANT, FINNEMORE, SELL, 
2010, p. 13). In other words, if people and States start to questioning and doubting the actions 
of the Council in these terms, it will no longer exert deference upon them in moral bases. 
 Finally, and similarly to the principled authority, it is possible to assign the capacity-
based authority to the Security Council as long as it shows itself capable of dealing efficiently 
with matters of peace and security around the globe. Because, again, this “authority is expected 
to accomplish some set of results (…) [by the] capacity for effective action”. (AVANT, 
FINNEMORE, SELL, 2010, p. 14). Recalling that would be hard to think of a “pure” capacity-
based authority, and that this authority generally comes from other sources, the Council also 
gets authority from the institutional and delegated source and would be questioned if it didn’t 
show perceived competence on matters of its responsibility. 
 However, there is a specific feature, or “privilege”, that inheres specially the five 
permanent members (P5) of the Council and that shows itself as a kind of “double-edged 
sword”: It can show “good” or “bad” results depending on how issues of international peace 
and security are understood by them. This “privilege” is the veto power and any decision must 
follow the notion that all of five permanent members has to vote favorably, or at least do not 
veto any issue, if these decisions are to be taken. (LUCK, 2006; LUCK, 2010). The next sub-
session will discuss briefly how the veto power was constituted and why it was created only for 




III.1. The Veto Power of the Permanent Members 
 
According to Luck (2010), the foundation of the United Nations and the Security 
Council was given by a series of meetings between the great powers at the time of the ending 
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of World War II at Dumbarton Oaks, Yalta and San Francisco. The Security Council of that 
time was concerned with different kinds of problems other than peacekeeping, genocide, 
terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, that appears to be one of the most salient issues in 
nowadays. (LUCK, 2010). 
Broadly speaking, the founding great powers of the UN and Security Council were 
concerned, first, “to defeat Axis powers and to build a more effective collective security 
apparatus than the League of Nations proved to be”; secondly, “they strove (…) to reserve for 
the Security Council the maximum possible decision-making flexibility as a political body, 
unencumbered by too many predetermined rules and guidelines”. Furthermore, the “self-
appointed Permanent Members of the Council, the four convening powers2 plus France” agreed 
that the Council should be in a position to deliberate to “a theoretically unlimited range of 
possible threats at a time and in a manner of its choosing”. (LUCK, 2010, p. 62,63). 
And finally, still according to Luck (2010), concerning the veto power of the five 
permanent members: “The veto and permanent membership, [agreed upon at Dumbarton Oaks 
and Yalta beforehand] were designed to transform a wartime alliance into a big power oligarchy 
to secure the hard-won peace that would follow”. (LUCK, 2010: 63). In sum, the founders of 
the organization “wanted a Security Council for all contingencies” (IBID), what takes us back 
to Luck’s (2010) consideration that the priorities of the great powers, in creating the Security 
Council, wasn’t equity, but control, performance and unity. (LUCK, 2010). 
Moreover, it is particularly interesting noting the relative favorable support that the great 
powers gave to the possession of the veto and the consequently unanimity that would follow 
from it. China advocated “the rule of unanimity” as a fundamental feature of the Council’s 
effectiveness and strength. Similarly, the British delegate during the debates concerning the 
veto, expressed that any arrangement not based on a great power unanimity “would be built on 
shifting sands, of no more value than the paper upon which it was written”. The idea was that 
implementing a “voting system”, instead of the rule of unanimity, although being “more 
perfect” at first sight, could in a certain moment weaken the Council efforts to act immediately 
and effectively. (LUCK, 2010, p. 79). 
Based on all these considerations, the veto power of the funding great powers of the 
Security Council, since the final years of World War II, and the consequently unity expected 
from it, was one of the key elements to the world peace and to the effective decisions in matters 
of war and peace in the view of the permanent members. (LUCK, 2010). However, not always 
 
2 The “four convening powers”, or “big four”, are: Great Britain, China, United States and Russia. (Luck, 2006; 
2010) 
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the unanimity between them took place to deal effectively with these matters, especially after 
2011, which this paper proposes to analyze, that covers the intervention in Libya and the 
beginning of the civil war on Syria. 
 
IV. THE LIBYA INTERVENTION UNDER THE R2P PRINCIPLES AND THE 
ABSTENTIONS OF SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS 
 
According to Engelbrekt (2013), the “legal standing” upon which lies the Security 
Council legitimacy comes mostly from its Charter, that as seen before, was agreed by all 
member states of the United Nations after the Second World War. But this legitimacy would 
depend as well on a “wider system of written and unwritten rules, including international law 
and the practices of diplomacy”. (ENGELBREKT, 2013, p. 41). The Charter has implicitly 
made the Council the “chief custodian” of a larger set of acceptable rules the have unfolded 
upon many countries over time. However, even considering that many of the rules related to 
peace and security matters are fully and “deep entrenched” in the actions of States, “they cannot 
be immutable”. (ENGELBREKT, 2013, p. 42). 
Engelbrekt (2013) continues its argument saying that, in recent years, a kind of 
“reinterpretation” about the Council’s obligation is being made concerning issue areas like 
civilian conflicts or the vulnerability of women and children in such contexts. All that 
associated with “a conceptual recalibration from state to human security as well as a tendency 
to place greater emphasis on the responsibility of governments”. The result of these 
reinterpretations, added to the notion of the government responsibility in taking care of human 
security matters, was the “adoption of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)3 concept by the UN 
General Assembly in 2005, declaring that the international community carries a responsibility 
to prevent and halt mass atrocity crimes perpetrated against civilians”. (ENGELBREKT, 2013, 
p. 42; GUIMARÃES & CARVALHO, 2017).  
 
3 The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was created back in 2001 when the International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty (ICISS) released the Responsibility to Protect report that aimed to “forge a sustainable 
compromise between countries that find humanitarian intervention an acceptable means to prevent or halt genocide 
or mass atrocities on the one hand, and governments that strongly support state sovereignty and non- interference 
into domestic affairs on the other”. (ENGELBREKT, 2013: 43). But was only in 2005 that it was adopted by UN’s 
General Assembly as a guiding norm to deal with new humanitarian issues and bring the necessary legitimacy to 
the United Nations’ (and Security Council) deliberations. (ENGELBREKT, 2013). 
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It was in 2011 then, under the threats of mass atrocities and massacres in Libya4, by the 
government of Muammar Gaddafi, that came the opportunity of implementing the 
reinterpretations over the states responsibilities, and the Security Council responsibilities, over 
humanitarian matters and need to respond to them. In this sense, the principles of the R2P 
doctrine were rapidly associated with a series of new understandings by several member states 
of UN on the need of consensus over the situation aroused in Libya, and the need of 
implementing, military if necessary, the Security Council Resolution 1973.Still according to 
Engelbrekt (2013), “although Resolution 19735 contains no explicit mention of the 
Responsibility to Protect, hardly anybody disputes that the R2P norm constitutes the key 
doctrine behind the outcome”. The principles of the R2P was then applied for the first time in 
practice, in more than ten years of its creation, in the political arena of international norms. 
(ENGELBREKT, 2013, p. 43). 
But one interesting fact that is worth noting in the Libya intervention, besides the clear 
application of the R2P norm as a key justification of the intervention, is that Resolution 1973 
(S/Res/1973) was adopted by ten (10) favorable votes, none against, and five (5) abstentions: 
by Brazil, Germany, India, China and Russia6 (UNITED NATIONS, 2011; SECURITY 
COUNCIL REPORT, 2017; NIKITIN, 2012) the last two being permanent members of the 
Council. The voting system of the Security Council is given by the Charter of United Nations 
on Chapter V, Article 27 that stipulates the following rules:  
Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote. Decisions of the Security 
Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members. 
Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative 
vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; 
provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a 
party to a dispute shall abstain from voting. (UNITED NATIONS; Charter; 2019, 
Chapter V, Article 27). 
 
 This voting system suggests that, to be approved, a resolution must have at least nine 
approving, or affirmative, but no negative votes of any permanent member, which in this case, 
vetoes the entire resolution. But if a permanent member abstains from vote, that doesn’t 
configure a veto, and because of that the resolution concerning the Libyan situation could be 
approved. 
 
4 The purpose of this section, and of this paper, is not discuss in details the reasons behind the massacres and 
human rights violations by the Libyan government in 2011. The intent is to use this background to understand the 
actions of the Security Council regarding this specific situation.  
5 For a full view of the Resolution’s guidelines, see: <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-
documents/document/libya-s-res-1973.php>. 
6 Even not directly related, it is interesting noting that four of the five members of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, 
India, China and South Africa) abstained from voting. Further investigation on this fact would be necessary in 
analyzing some kind of correlation between these two variables. 
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The states that abstained from voting on the Resolution 1973, seemed to have some 
reasons for that. For example, once the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and its 
allies, showed to have a great influence during the process of the intervention, Germany 
sounded “uncomfortable” in supporting a new intervention from the Western powers in the 
North Africa and Middle East alike but, in the end, decided not act against its NATO allies 
“from trying to avert what everyone agreed was a major humanitarian disaster in the making”, 
caused fundamentally by the Libyan regime. (ENGELBREKT, 2013, p. 50). 
Regarding Brazil’s and India’s abstentions, Engelbrekt (2013) understands that it 
happened because both countries, being rotate members in the Council for a two-year mandate, 
needed to manifest a resolute and principled foreign policy, avoiding being subservient to the 
great powers (to their domestic audience), while considering the big appeal of humanitarian 
views and, at the same time, “not alienating any of the permanent Security Council members”, 
given that both countries long for permanent seats in the (unknown reform of the) Council. 
(ENGELBREKT, 2013, p. 50-51). 
About China’s and Russia’s abstention in the Resolution, it should be recalled that both 
countries, aside from being permanent members of the Council, have always expressed the 
importance of state sovereignty and no intervention in domestic matters “as core principles of 
universally applicable international law”, and for that reason, no unjustified or unilateral 
intervention should be taken. (ENGELBREKT, 2013, p. 51; NIKITIN, 2012). However, China 
has shown some “flexibility” in the perception that, when challenges to peace and security 
arises, the handling of these issues should be delegated to regional transnational bodies “where 
there is widespread agreement on a course of action”, and, for that reason, international bodies 
like the Arab League, the Islamic Conference Organization and the Gulf Cooperation could not 
be neglected by China. (ENGELBREKT, 2013, p. 51). 
And finally, the Russian Federation has always advocated for the principles of non-
intervention and state sovereignty, and of the five permanent members, would most likely be 
the one to vetoes the resolution; in part because Russia “never seriously contemplated lending 
support for a no-fly zone, let alone a resolution that would authorize a more extensive type of 
military intervention”. But since the end of the Cold War, Russia avoids standing alone in major 
disputes, like the Libyan intervention, in the Council, what could in part explain its abstention. 
(ENGELBREKT, 2013, p. 51). 
Nonetheless, what was agreed in Resolution 1973 was the protection of civilians by “all 
necessary measures” under the R2P norm (ENGELBREKT, 2013) but the intervention “took 
sides” and ended with the regime change of Libyan state, toppling Gaddafi. (SOUZA & 
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MACHADO, 2015; NIKITIN, 2012; EGNELL, 2013). Since then, Russia (in compliance with 
China) disapproves every try of the Western powers to implement policy regarding security and 
peace matters, especially with regard the war on Syria. 
 
IV.1. Russia’s Actions in the Syrian War as a Response to the Libyan Intervention 
 
The Syrian conflict began in March of 2011, when protests took place against President 
Bashar Al-Assad's government, which were quickly suppressed and which turned into a 
complex civil war. Such protests and demonstrations would have resulted from the so-called 
“Arab Spring”, which was marked by a wave of protests in the countries of the Middle East and 
North Africa that fundamentally demanded constitutional reforms, greater political openness, 
freedom of expression and democracy. (ZAHREDDINE, 2013; MERELES, 2016). 
The relationship between Russia and Syria is also interesting of highlight, as long as it 
gave the foundation to its relations nowadays. The relationship between Soviets and Syrians, 
according to Piccolli, Machado and Monteiro (2016), would have started with the signing of a 
secret agreement, prior to the declaration of Syrian independence in 1946. Four years later, in 
1950, such a relationship would have advanced “in the sense of a non-aggression pact, and the 
expansion of Soviet economic and military assistance to Syrians, "it being worth remembering 
that, in the context of the Cold War," Syria was establishing itself as a Soviet satellite country 
in the Middle East, and was seen as an ally to guarantee an area of influence in the region, as 
well as the maintenance of nuclear balance”. (PICCOLLI; MACHADO; MONTEIRO, 2016, 
p. 190).  
At the end of the 1970s, there was then the beginning of the government of the al-Assad 
family in Syria, which, through a coup, proclaimed Hafez al-Assad to power, a government 
which represents the culmination of the relationship between the two countries. An example, 
capable of demonstrating the importance of such relations, would be the Syrian-Soviet 
Friendship and Cooperation Treaty, concluded in October 1980, "which, among several articles, 
provided for military cooperation between the parties". (PICCOLLI; MACHADO; 
MONTEIRO, 2016, p. 191). 
Then, right after the Libyan intervention ended, Russia vehemently disapproved the 
western modus operandi of taking sides in the conflict, toppling the current regime beyond so 
called R2P norms as justification for the intervention, as seen before. (SOUZA & MACHADO, 
2015; ENGELBREKT, 2013). In this sense, Russia, alongside with China, strongly condemned 
the regime change imposed by the western powers under the pretext of civilian protection in 
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Libya. Therefore, in attempt of preventing the repetition of such context with Syria, Russia has 
made use of the veto in the UNSC in order to prevent, or even weaken, western undertakings, 
and in the Syrian case, the number of Russian vetoes would already be four. (SOUZA, 
MACHADO, 2015, p. 57-58). 
For last but not least, in geostrategic terms, “the Syrian-Iraqi-Iranian project (supported 
by the Russians) to build the Islamic Gas Pipeline for the export of Iranian and Russian gas to 
Europe” and, on the other hand, “the project to build a gas pipeline that would supply Europe 
from of Qatar's reserves from the territories of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria and Israel”, 
(PICOLLI; MACHADO; MONTEIRO, 2016, p. 195) would also be of great interest on the part 
of Russia regarding the Syrian conflict.  
Furthermore, aligned with the aforementioned premises, Phillips (2016) argues that one 
of Russia’s strategies in intervening in the war is that, since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, 
Putin’s aim was to acquire recognition to Russia as “a global superpower on an equal footing 
with the US, not subordinate as it had been in the 1990s and 2000s”, thus, trying to “break” the 
US-dominated post-Cold War order. Besides, still in geostrategic terms, the Syrian intervention 
reduced, in some sense, the diplomatic isolation that the western powers had imposed on Russia 
since the Crimea annexation. (PHILLIPS, 2016, p. 220). 
 
V. RUSSIA’S PERCEPTIONS ABOUT GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND ITS VOTES IN 
THE SECURITY COUNCIL FROM 1947 TO 2014 
 
Nikitin (2012) argues that Russia perceives itself, in the second decade of the twenty-
first century7, as a country “with global responsibilities” and, moreover, considers the Security 
Council one of the “leading mechanisms for collective global governance and coordination of 
interests between major powers”. (NIKITIN, 2012, p. 2). This is true insofar as Russia’s 
National Security Strategy for 2020 postulates that Russia:  
[P]erceives the United Nations and the Security Council of the United Nations as a 
central element of a stable system of international relations, at the basis of which lie 
respect, equal rights and mutually beneficial cooperation among nations, resting on 
civilized political instruments for the resolution of global and regional crisis 
situations. (NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY…, 2019). 
 
 Furthermore, in the “Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation”, Russia 
understands that the United Nations “should remain the center for regulation of international 
 
7 It is relevant to emphasize the second decade of the twenty-first century because after the end of the Cold War, 
Russia didn’t show itself very preoccupied about international issues as it shows, at least, in the last ten years, 
especially in the Putin Era. (NIKITIN, 2012; SOUZA & MACHADO, 2015) 
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relations and coordination in world politics in the 21st century, as it has proven to have no 
alternative and also possesses unique legitimacy”. (THE FOREIGN POLICY CONCEPT…, 
2013). It can be seen then, the key importance Russia gives to the role of collective 
arrangements, like the UN and the Security Council, in deliberating and coming to decisions 
multilaterally, while it guarantees the “sovereign equality of all peaceful states” and the 
preservation of peace and security. (NIKITIN, 2012, p. 2). 
 However, even considering the importance of multilateral forums and organizations as 
key mechanisms to ensure international peace and security, at the same time it ensures the 
principles of non-intervention and sovereignty of states, Russia in fact, like the other permanent 
members, uses its veto power when it considers that some decisions or resolutions are 
“contradictory [to] their interests or their understanding of international realities”. (NIKITIN, 
2012, p. 7). But it was not always so. 
 For example, from 1947 to 1958, Russia (still USSR), vetoed only one UN 
Peacekeeping Operations: concerning the situation in Greece/Bulgaria, Albania and 
Yugoslavia, and abstained from the other five: UNCI, 1947, Indonesia; UNTSO, 1948, Middle 
East; UNMOGIP, 1949, India/Pakistan; UNEF, 1956-1967, Middle East; UNOGIL, 1958, 
Lebanon8. Notwithstanding, the USSR from 1960 to 1990 only vetoed, but later gave support 
to, the UN Operation UNGOMAP (United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan) in Afghanistan and Pakistan, in 1988; In all others decisions, the USSR abstained or 
support operations. (NIKITIN, 2012, p. 4). 
 In comparison with the pattern of votes of Russia (USSR), from 1989 to 1992, it can be 
seen that it consistently supported, didn’t vetoed or abstained, UN Peacekeeping Operations on 







Table 1. USSR Votes in Draft Resolutions of Security Council and Peacekeeping Operations from 1989 
to 1992. 
 
8United Nations Commission for Indonesia (UNCI); United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO); 
United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP); United Nations Emergence Force 
(UNEF); United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL). 
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Source: NIKITIN, 2012, p. 4 
 
 It is important to highlight that not all Operations were supported with peacekeepers or 
financial resources, but all of them were supported politically within the UN and Security 
Council’s framework, which shows a relatively high compliance with the other members of the 
Council in giving the necessary “unanimity” for implementing Resolutions. 
 But after 1991 it started changing. According to Nikitin (2012), in the past two decades, 
the United States used its veto fifteen (15) times (in open sessions), and Russia voted against 
drafts resolutions eight (8) times, as shows Table 2: 
Table 2. Draft Resolutions Vetoed by Russia (alone) or Accompanied by other Permanent Member 
(Open Sessions) – 1993-2012 
Source: NIKITIN, 2012, p. 8 
 
 Nikitin (2012) shows that, from 1993 to 2012, Russia vetoed draft resolutions eight (8) 
times. This is a high rate voting in comparison with the past decades of votes of USSR, what 
shows some abnormal change of vote pattern from Russia in the international scenario. 
Furthermore, in consonance with Nikitin (2012) but going further in the analysis of Russia’s 
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vetoes in the Security Council, Souza & Machado (2015) bring nine (9) times when Russia 
vetoed resolutions in the Security Council, from 2004 to 2014: 
 
Table 3. Russia’s Vetoes in Security Council – 2004- 2014 
Year Issue Countries which followed Russia in the veto 
2004 Situation in Cyprus None 
2007 Situation in Myanmar China 
2008 Situation in Zimbabwe China 
2009 War on Georgia None 
2011 War on Syria China 
2012 War on Syria China 
2012 War on Syria China 
2014 Situation in Ukraine None 
2014 War on Syria China 
Source: Withdrawn and adapted from SOUZA & MACHADO (2015, p. 56). 
 
 Table 3 above brings the same issues vetoed by Russia from 2004 to 2012, seen in 
Nikitin (2012), plus the veto in the Ukraine/Crimean situation and another veto concerning the 
war on Syria. These tables show how Russian vetoes highly increased in the Security Council 
in a range of twenty (20) years (1993-2014). In other words, the Russian vetoes were way more 
frequent in just twenty years, especially from earlier 2000’s to 2014, then it was in the past four 
or five decades of Council activity, as USSR, after the end of World War II and during the Cold 
War. The question is: what led to that? 
 
VI. POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS ABOUT WHY RUSSIAN VETOES IN THE 
SECURITY COUNCIL INCREASED IN THE PAST TWO DECADES 
 
The first plausible explanation about why Russia increased its veto power in the Security 
Council, lies in the fact that, within Putin administration in earlier 2000’s, Russia started to 
redefine its international long term goals adopting a “external pragmatist” being more realist 
about its ambitions and capabilities. Notwithstanding, even adopting an external pragmatism in 
earlier 2000’s, in the context of the attacks of 9/11 in 2001, Russia supported the United States 
in Afghanistan in an attempt of “internationalize” the terrorist threat, legitimizing its actions 
against Chechnya. (SOUZA & MACHADO, 2015, p. 54; NIKITIN, 2012). 
But in the time Iraq War in 2003, Russia withdrew its support to the United States and 
started an important cooperation with China aiming a strategic cooperation with it, while it 
became an important ally in the Security Council. This can be seen in the several votes, in drafts 
and resolutions, that China externalizes following the Russian votes in the Council. Moreover, 
still according to Souza and Machado (2015), Russia seems to consider both countries sharing 
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the same positions about global issues one of the central elements to global and regional 
stability. In this sense, Russia would intend to promote the political cooperation with China in 
several issue areas, including the Security Council arena. (SOUZA & MACHADO, 2015, p. 
54, 57). 
Another explanation for the increasing in Russia’s vetoes is in the own National Security 
Strategy for 2020, and in the recent Russian Foreign Policy Concept9, that indicates several 
conditions for the reinsertion of Russia in the international system in a pragmatic and assertive 
way. Nikitin (2012) understands that this so called pragmatism10 in Russia’s international 
actions had more than once be one of the leading principles of Russian foreign policy that are 
present in the Russian Foreign Policy Concept as well in the National Security Strategy for 
2020. (SOUZA & MACHADO, 2015; NIKITIN, 2012, p. 6). 
Nevertheless, even knowing that the Russian Foreign Policy Concept, the National 
Security Strategy for 2020 and the redefinition of foreign policy by Putin’s administration could 
be important explanations about why Russia increased its participations, and consequently its 
vetoes in Security Council, the following explanations should give a better panorama of more 
“tangible” motives behind those vetoes.  
Recalling that the intervention on Libyan civil war and massacres by its government 
started from the need of implementation of the R2P norm and principles but ended with the 
western powers, through NATO, taking sides and blurring its neutrality toppling Gaddafi’s 
regime (ENGELBREKT, 2013; SOUZA & MACHADO, 2015; NIKITIN, 2012; EGNELL, 
2013) Russia, strong disapproving this fact and to avoid this same scenario of regime change 
on Syria, vetoed (almost) every attempt of the Security Council to act upon the conflict on Syria 
(SOUZA & MACHADO, 2015; NIKITIN, 2012; CHARAP, 2013; GUIMARÃES AND 
CARVALHO, 2017) following requirements like: 
(1) Avoid unjustified and uncoordinated international interference in the internal 
affairs of sovereign states in the absence of clear “responsibility to protect” criteria; 
(2) Avoid the imposition of international sanctions that would harm the general 
population of the country rather than the targeted regime; (3) Keep UN-mandated 
operations constantly within the rigid framework of the voted mandate, avoiding 
“loose” interpretations of the mandate as a kind of carte-blanche for various ad hoc 
actions; (4) Maintain neutrality, an equal distance and the unbiased character of 
 
9 Generally speaking, the goals of the Russian Foreign Policy Concept are: (1) The guarantee of security and state 
sovereignty in the international system; (2) The economic and technologic development of the country; (3) The 
promotion of peace and security policies in international arena and collective actions in the UN should be taken 
always considering its Charter; (4) The promotion of good relations with neighbors’ states; (5) The active 
participation in multilateral forums like the own UN and organizations like BRICS and G20; (6) Strengthening of 
Russian foreign commerce and economy; and (7) The dialogue and respect with others religions and costumes of 
different nations. (Souza and Machado, 2015, p. 54-56) 
10 Pragmatism understood “not only as freedom to make ad hoc decisions, but, more importantly, as freedom from 
old Soviet-motivated ideological orientations, international friendships and rivalries”. (Nikitin, 2012, p. 6). 
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international interference, avoiding “taking sides” in regional conflicts. (Nikitin, 
2012, p. 8). 
 
It should be noted however, the close relationship of cooperation Russia and Syria 
maintained beyond the war per se. Both Guimarães & Carvalho (2017) and Souza & Machado 
(2015) agree with the historical relations that Russia and Syria maintain among themselves 
since the time of USSR, not to mention the Russian port of Tartus in Syria that gives access to 
Mediterranean Sea and that shows itself as an important strategic location for Russia. (SOUZA 
& MACHADO, 2015; GUIMARÃES AND CARVALHO, 2017). 
Furthermore, deeper strategic economic reasons can be seen within the war, where the 
counterpart of Russian and US interests (along with Turkey and the European Union) would be 
between competing energy supply projects, where, on the one hand, “the Syrian-Iraqi-Iranian 
(Russian-supported) project to build the Islamic Gas Pipeline for the export of Iranian and 
Russian gas to Europe” and, on the other hand, “the construction of a gas pipeline that would 
supply Europe from Qatar reserves, from the territories of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria 
and Israel. (PICOLLI, MACHADO, MONTEIRO, 2016, p. 195). 
Equally to the Libyan case, there was also an attempt to frame the intervention on Syria 
on the aegis of the R2P and its consequently need to protect civilians of crimes against 
humanity, massacres and mass atrocities, beyond the recognized responsibility of other nations 
to act in defense of such populations. (GUIMARÃES & CARVALHO, 2017). But, as said 
earlier, in order to avoid and prevent that the Syrian case turned into a “second Libya”, (i.e. 
with the toppling of regime under the speech of secure civilian and human lives), Russia, 
followed by China, started vetoing, or partially vetoing, drafts and resolutions related to the 
Syrian case, in order to protect its own interests (military and economic) while prevents the 
influence of the western powers upon the Arab state, creating a stalemate in the Security 




This paper aimed to analyze the nuances of global governance, how it works, who does 
it, and what is the role of the Security Council in it. It was possible to notice that the Security 
Council indeed shows itself as an important piece of global governance and as a global 
governor, because it addresses and take decisions upon worldwide problems that are beyond 
the capacity of individual states, and it exercises power, creates issues and sets agendas for the 
purpose of affecting policy of these same states. At the same time, the authority of the Council 
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comes from two main sources: its own Charter, that stipulates the range of this authority upon 
the member states of the United Nations, and from the delegation and acknowledgment of states 
of the legal and institutional authority the Council has in making binding policy for them. 
(AVANT, FINNEMORE and SELL, 2010; UNITED NATIONS, CHARTER; 2019). 
Concerning the veto power of the Permanent Members of the Security Council, it was 
agreed back in the creation of the UN that only the great powers of the post-World War II would 
possess this kind of power in order to ensure a bigger effectivity in making decisions about 
peace and security issues, in addition to reach consensus more easily with a smaller council. 
(LUCK, 2010). But consensus on peace and security issues wasn’t always present in the 
Council. As it turned out, Russia in earlier 2000’s started to position itself, under Putin’s 
administration, in a more assertive and pragmatic way. By the time it abstained in Libya’s 
intervention and the situation didn’t end up like expected for it, Russia, plus China, started 
vetoing resolutions about the Syrian civil war blocking a series of actions of the western 
countries upon the Arab state. 
Considering the theory and concepts of global governance seen in the first sessions of 
this paper, this kind of behavior by the part of two permanent members of the highest authority 
Council in the UN, could be seen as a “freezing” in global governance as long as this didn’t 
bring the expected “predictability, stability, and order to transboundary problems” as a 
collective arrangement in the Libyan and Syrian cases. (WEISS, THAKUR, 2010, p. 6; 
AVANT, FINNEMORE, SELL, 2010, p. 1). But it is interesting noting that Russia, even 
vetoing resolutions about the war on Syria, and having particular interests in it, started taking 
individual actions like, for example, negotiating with Assad’s government the handover of 
chemical weapons to the OPCW (Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons), in 
2013, when the United States unilaterally threatened to attack the country by discovering the 
use of such weapons. (SOUZA and MACHADO, 2015). 
Furthermore, when Russia blocked the implementation of resolutions, fully or partially, 
it continued the “negotiations with other major states through the G8 and other formats, and 
used NATO-Russia Council sessions, OIC and LAS meetings, ASEAN and APEC summits for 
multilateral diplomacy”. (NIKITIN, 2012, p. 10). That is, Russia made available new channels 
of negotiation and communication with other countries through “new regional arrangements 
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and organizations”. (NIKITIN, 2012, p. 14)11. In sum, Russia chose to lead its own way of 
global governance rather than act merely through the Council. 
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